The Sentient Animal

     In determining an answer to the question of whether we have an obligation to obey the law, Rawls defends the affirmative answer by appealing to a concept he refers to as the special obligation of fair play. He thinks this principle grounds two key moral claims:   “sometimes we have an obligation to obey what we think, and think correctly, is an unjust law; and second, that sometimes we have an obligation to obey a law even in a situation where more good (thought of as a sum of social advantages) would seem to result from not doing so” (232).       In this paper I will briefly explain how Rawls believes the special obligation of fair play grounds these obligations. Then, I will briefly discuss Simmons’ criticisms of the obligation as put forward by Rawls. After doing this, I will briefly sketch out Rawls’ theory as to when civil disobedience is justified. At this point, I will be able to present my argument that Simmons’ criticisms of the special obligation of fair play amount to s

A significant portion of literature on Hume in recent years has focused on the nature of and importance of Hume’s distinction between calm and violent passions. This is for many reasons, but perhaps most prominently the fact that calm passions are a key part of Hume’s robust defense of his well known claim that “reason is, and ought only to be, a slave to the passions.” Hume’s argument relies on a crucial distinction between ideas and calm passions, despite being experienced very similarly. Using the arguments from various scholars regarding the nature and importance of calm passions in Hume’s work, I am going to attempt to introduce a novel framing of calm passions given modern work in phenomenology in an attempt to add to the conversation surrounding Hume’s ideas.  In his book Experiences of Depression: A study in Phenomenology , Matthew Ratcliffe argues that “most experiences of depression involve a change in the overall structure of experience” (15). He refers to this change as a