A Response to Emery's Case for a Circularity Problem of Humean Laws
In her paper “The Governing Conception of Laws”, Nina Emery defends an argument for a governing conception of laws of nature that she also claims produces a novel circularity argument against a Humean understanding of laws. Essentially, she makes this argument by identifying a certain principle that constrains theory choice in physics, showing how this theory would be applied in metaphysical theorizing, and explaining why one who accepts the principle in physics should adopt the principle for metaphysics. She then shows why a metaphysician who adopts the metaphysical version of the principle should be, prior to further argument, (i) inclined to accept a governing conception of laws and (ii) reject a Humean view of laws based on the circularity problem it imposes. I will argue that a reinterpretation of the scientific examples is required, and that this reinterpretation requires adjusting the principle in question in such a way that is fatal to Emery’s argument. I will then cons