Posts

On the Relationship of the Scope of a Special Obligation to Fair Play and the Scope of Justified Civil Disobedience

     In determining an answer to the question of whether we have an obligation to obey the law, Rawls defends the affirmative answer by appealing to a concept he refers to as the special obligation of fair play. He thinks this principle grounds two key moral claims:   “sometimes we have an obligation to obey what we think, and think correctly, is an unjust law; and second, that sometimes we have an obligation to obey a law even in a situation where more good (thought of as a sum of social advantages) would seem to result from not doing so” (232).       In this paper I will briefly explain how Rawls believes the special obligation of fair play grounds these obligations. Then, I will briefly discuss Simmons’ criticisms of the obligation as put forward by Rawls. After doing this, I will briefly sketch out Rawls’ theory as to when civil disobedience is justified. At this point, I will be able to present my argument that Simmons’ criticisms of the special obligation of fair play amount to s

Calm Passions in Hume as Understood by Paxman and Ratcliffe’s concept of Existential Feeling: A Comparison

A significant portion of literature on Hume in recent years has focused on the nature of and importance of Hume’s distinction between calm and violent passions. This is for many reasons, but perhaps most prominently the fact that calm passions are a key part of Hume’s robust defense of his well known claim that “reason is, and ought only to be, a slave to the passions.” Hume’s argument relies on a crucial distinction between ideas and calm passions, despite being experienced very similarly. Using the arguments from various scholars regarding the nature and importance of calm passions in Hume’s work, I am going to attempt to introduce a novel framing of calm passions given modern work in phenomenology in an attempt to add to the conversation surrounding Hume’s ideas.  In his book Experiences of Depression: A study in Phenomenology , Matthew Ratcliffe argues that “most experiences of depression involve a change in the overall structure of experience” (15). He refers to this change as a

A Response to Emery's Case for a Circularity Problem of Humean Laws

        In her paper “The Governing Conception of Laws”, Nina Emery defends an argument for a governing conception of laws of nature that she also claims produces a novel circularity argument against a Humean understanding of laws. Essentially, she makes this argument by identifying a certain principle that constrains theory choice in physics, showing how this theory would be applied in metaphysical theorizing, and explaining why one who accepts the principle in physics should adopt the principle for metaphysics. She then shows why a metaphysician who adopts the metaphysical version of the principle should be, prior to further argument, (i) inclined to accept a governing conception of laws and (ii) reject a Humean view of laws based on the circularity problem it imposes. I will argue that a reinterpretation of the scientific examples is required, and that this reinterpretation requires adjusting the principle in question in such a way that is fatal to Emery’s argument. I will then cons

The Specifics of Evil: Why Saving a Fallen World Requires Deep Understanding of What's Fallen

       Introduction      (Disclaimer: Since I have a wide Christian audience, for the purpose of this text I'm treating God and Jesus as the same person. Obviously, LDS believe Jesus is God's son. This shouldn't have too much effect on the premise of the blogpost.)      The primary premise of the Christian faith is fascinating. We are sinners, and thus are not naturally worthy to be in the presence of a supremely benevolent being, our creator God. God's solution? Put himself in our shoes. That is what the atonement is, God experiencing our suffering, experiencing our sin. In order to save us, God had to learn what imperfection was like. He had to learn what our suffering was like. He had to take on every burden. This, supposedly, was the only way to redeem a fallen world.      Whether God suffered that we all may be saved or not, our world is still a fallen one. Yes, for Christians, an eternal perspective is important. Preparation for the infinite life to come is doubtl

Why I'm Vegan, What I know, What I Don't Know, and Why All of That Matters

 I used to be one for flashy attention-grabbing sentences and so on but I'm really not feeling that kind of thing these days so I'm just gonna jump right into it.  Why I Went Vegan     I think the fact of my relationship to philosophy was crucial in my becoming vegan. I think a class introducing me to rigorous studies of ethical thought is a big part of what prepared me for when I first learned about animal ethics. Deontology and utilitarianism were among the primary three categories we were taught (along with virtue ethics). Obviously, all three seemed to have things going for them and flaws. But the point is that I was introduced to them. Whether they encompassed all of ethical thought didn't matter; they do seem together to comprise a large portion of how we think ethically. I've since learned care ethics is a growing view in normative ethics, but more on that later. The other sense in which the fact of my relationship to philosophy was crucial was the simple fact th

Blog Intro

Hello! As most people reading this will know, I am @veganbyuatheist on Twitter. And (consequently) as most people know, I am a vegan atheist studying Philosophy at BYU. I graduate after Fall 2021. Maybe at some point I'll share my deconversion story, but it isn't all that interesting. I'd much prefer talking philosophy. It is sufficient for now to simply state that it was upon learning there are reasonable objections to Christianity that I fell to agnosticism, and that my class on the Problem of Evil pushed me towards atheism.  In a lecture, one of my professors stated he found the problem of "human suffering" in relation to the problem of evil "much more interesting" than the problem of animal suffering. While I can respect this, I can also respectfully differ. I will say I have plenty of interest in the problem of human suffering as well. For instance, I do have a significant interest in how well soul-building theodicies and free-will defenses fair in