On the Relationship of the Scope of a Special Obligation to Fair Play and the Scope of Justified Civil Disobedience
In determining an answer to the question of whether we have an obligation to obey the law, Rawls defends the affirmative answer by appealing to a concept he refers to as the special obligation of fair play. He thinks this principle grounds two key moral claims: “sometimes we have an obligation to obey what we think, and think correctly, is an unjust law; and second, that sometimes we have an obligation to obey a law even in a situation where more good (thought of as a sum of social advantages) would seem to result from not doing so” (232). In this paper I will briefly explain how Rawls believes the special obligation of fair play grounds these obligations. Then, I will briefly discuss Simmons’ criticisms of the obligation as put forward by Rawls. After doing this, I will briefly sketch out Rawls’ theory as to when civil disobedience is justified. At this point, I will be able to present my argument that Simmons’ criticisms of the special obligation of fair play amount to s